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a/k/a Ariceli Flores 
JESUS ALBERTO FLORES-NOVA; 
ARACELI CASTAÑO-GARDUNO, 
Petitioners 
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ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency Nos. A099-690-362 and A094-941-559) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Charles Honeyman 
____________________________________ 
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                         (Opinion Filed: July 25, 2011) 
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Jacqueline B. Martinez, Esq. 
JBM Immigration Group 
428 Forbes Avenue, Suite 2510 
Pittsburgh, PA  15219 
 Counsel for Petitioners 
 
Nairi S. Gruzenski, Esq. 
Andrew J. Oliveira, Esq. 
Phillip M. Truman, Esq. 
United States Department of Justice 
Office of Immigration Litigation 
Civil Division 
P.O. Box 878 
Ben Franklin Station 
Washington, DC  20044 
 Counsel for Respondent 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
Jesus Alberto Flores-Nova and his wife, Araceli 
Castaño-Garduno, both natives and citizens of Mexico, 
petition for review of the order of the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (“BIA”) denying their application for cancellation of 
removal.  For the reasons that follow, we will deny the 
petition on the merits. 
Flores-Nova and Castaño-Garduno came to the United 
States without a valid visa or other travel documents in June 
1992 and August 1996, respectively.  They have three 
American born children (ages five, ten, and eleven).  In 
September 1999, the Petitioners travelled to Mexico to attend 
 3 
the funeral of Flores-Nova‟s father.  While there, Araceli 
Castaño-Garduno was injured in a serious fall.  During the 
course of her medical treatment, Castaño-Garduno learned 
that she was pregnant.  She was placed in the care of a 
midwife, who restricted her to bed rest and directed her not to 
travel until the threat of miscarriage had abated.  The 
Petitioners returned to the United States in February 2000.
1
  
When their religious worker visa applications were denied, 
the Department of Homeland Security placed the couple in 
consolidated removal proceedings for being present without 
authorization or parole.  In 2008, the Petitioners applied for 
cancellation of removal under INA § 240A(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1229b(b)(1), claiming their continuous physical presence in 
the United States for ten years, the absence of any criminal 
statutory bars, and exceptional and extremely unusual 
hardship on their children if the Petitioners were removed to 
Mexico. 
The Government filed a motion to pretermit the 
Petitioners‟ applications because they failed to maintain the 
requisite continuous presence in the United States because of 
their 176-day absence.  The Petitioners conceded that they 
left the country for 176 days, but argued that special 
circumstances occasioned by Castaño-Garduno‟s medical 
needs warranted excusing, or equitably tolling, their absence 
of physical presence in the United States for humanitarian 
reasons. 
The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied the Petitioners‟ 
applications for cancellation of removal, ordered them 
removed to Mexico, and granted voluntary departure.  
                                                 
1
 In 2004, Flores-Nova travelled to Mexico for six 
days to interview for an H-2B visa. 
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Although sympathetic to the Petitioners‟ plight, the IJ found 
nothing in the “unambiguous language” of the statute or in 
caselaw that provided the kind of excuse or equitable tolling 
that the Petitioners requested.  Pet‟rs‟ App. Vol. I at 50-51.  
The IJ pretermitted the Petitioners‟ applications because their 
prolonged stay in Mexico created a break in their continuous 
physical presence in the United States in excess of ninety 
days, and thus their continuous presence was deemed to have 
ended under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(2).  The BIA affirmed and 
summarily dismissed the Petitioners‟ appeal.  The Petitioners 
filed this timely petition for review. 
The Petitioners raise four arguments in their petition 
for review:  first, the BIA‟s strict construction of the 
continuous presence provision is impermissible and is not 
entitled to deference under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); 
second, the continuous presence provision violates the 
Petitioners‟ rights under the Equal Protection Clause; third, 
the United States is bound by international law to grant the 
petitioners a full hearing on their applications for cancellation 
of removal; and fourth, pretermitting the Petitioners‟ 
application for cancellation of removal without a hearing on 
the merits violated the due process rights of their American 
born children. 
We have jurisdiction to review the constitutional 
claims and questions of law raised in this petition for review 
 5 
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D).
2
  Sukwanputra v. 
Gonzales, 434 F.3d 627, 634 (3d Cir. 2006).  “We review the 
BIA‟s legal determinations de novo, subject to established 
principles of deference.”  Wang v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 347, 
349 (3d Cir. 2004). 
We need not conduct a Chevron analysis regarding the 
first claim because there is nothing impermissible about the 
                                                 
2
 We disagree with the Government‟s contention that 
we lack jurisdiction to consider the Petitioners‟ fourth claim 
because it is not exhausted.  The Petitioners allege that their 
minor children‟s right to reside in the United States was 
violated because the Petitioners were denied the opportunity 
to present evidence of the extreme hardship their removal 
would impose on their citizen children.  Pet‟rs‟ Br. at 24-25 
(citing Acosta v. Gaffney, 558 F.2d 1153 (3d Cir. 1977).  
Exhaustion is not required for substantive due process claims 
like the petitioners‟ because “the BIA does not have 
jurisdiction to adjudicate constitutional issues.”  Khan v. 
Att‟y Gen., 448 F.3d 226, 236 n.8 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting 
Bonhometre v. Gonzales, 414 F.3d 442, 447 n.7 (3d Cir. 
2005)).  On the merits, the Petitioners‟ arguments based on 
their children‟s constitutional rights are unpersuasive.  As we 
previously held, the deportation of the alien parents of 
children born in the United States does not violate the 
constitutional rights of the children to choose their residence.  
Acosta v. Gaffney, 558 F.2d at 1158 (parents‟ deportation 
“will merely postpone, but not bar, [the United States citizen 
child‟s] residence in the United States if [] he should 
ultimately choose to live here”).  Moreover, a hearing on the 
merits as to the extreme hardship factor would not change the 
result in this case because the Petitioners cannot satisfy the 
statutory continuous physical presence requirement. 
 6 
BIA‟s application of the stop-time rule contained in § 
1229b(d)(2).  See De Leon-Ochoa v. Att‟y Gen., 622 F.3d 
341, 353 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that the Chevron inquiry 
ends “if Congress has spoken directly to the question at issue, 
in which case „both the agency and the court must give effect 
to the plain language of the statute.‟”) (quoting Yusupov v. 
Att‟y Gen., 518 F.3d 185, 197 (3d Cir. 2008)).  The question 
at issue here is whether § 1229b(d)(2) provides for an 
exception to the 90/180-day stop-time rule for humanitarian 
reasons.  The Petitioners‟ argument that the provision is 
ambiguous is meritless.
3
  A statute is not ambiguous “merely 
because it does not expressly forbid every possible 
mechanism for functional – but not actual – satisfaction of 
statutory requirements.”  De Leon-Ochoa v. Att‟y Gen., 622 
F.3d at 353 (reviewing 8 U.S.C. § 1254a). 
We conclude that Congress has directly spoken to the 
issue through the plain language of the statute.  Section 
§ 1229b(d)(2) provides that “[a]n alien shall be considered to 
have failed to maintain continuous physical presence in the 
United States . . . if the alien has departed from the United 
States for any period in excess of 90 days or for any periods 
in the aggregate exceeding 180 days.”  See also Mendez-
Reyes v. Att‟y Gen., 428 F.3d 187, 191-92 (3d Cir. 2005) 
                                                 
3
 The Petitioners‟ reliance on Tapia v. Gonzales, 430 
F.3d 997 (9th Cir. 2005), is misplaced.  In Tapia, the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals merely held that the petitioner‟s 
physical presence was not interrupted by the fact that he was 
stopped at the border and turned away four times before he 
was allowed to reenter after a 30-day trip to attend a family 
member‟s funeral.  Id. at 1002.  Most important, the Court 
noted that § 1229b(d)(2) “mandate[s] that absences beyond 
the 90/180-day period would constitute a break.”  Id. at 1001. 
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(construing § 1229b(d)(2) as setting forth the circumstances 
“under which continuous physical presence must be deemed 
to have been broken” and that “Congress has declared that a 
departure of more than 90 days shall constitute a break in 
physical presence . . . .”) (emphasis in the original).  Contrary 
to the Petitioners‟ contention, their intent to return to the 
United States is irrelevant because § 1229b(d)(2) has no 
scienter requirement. 
The Petitioners‟ equal protection claim is also without 
merit because non-permanent resident aliens and permanent 
resident aliens seeking naturalization are not similarly 
situated groups for equal protection purposes.  “The fact that 
all persons, aliens and citizens alike, are protected by the Due 
Process Clause does not [mean] that all aliens are entitled to 
all the advantages of citizenship . . . .”  Mathews v. Diaz, 426 
U.S. 67, 78 (1976).  Nor does the Clause establish that “all 
aliens must be placed in a single homogeneous legal 
classification.”  Id.  In any event, the Petitioners failed to 
meet their burden of establishing that § 1229b(d)(2) is 
unconstitutional.  The standard of review applied in equal 
protection cases that do not involve suspect classes or the 
exercise of a fundamental constitutional right requires a 
“facially legitimate and bona fide” rationale supporting the 
immigration statute in question.  Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 
794-95 (1977); see also Breyer v. Meissner, 214 F.3d 416, 
422 n.6 (3d Cir. 2000) (recognizing that the “facially 
legitimate and bona fide reason” test in the immigration 
context “has been found analytically equivalent to the rational 
basis test normally applied in equal protection cases in which 
no suspect class is involved”) (citing other cases).  Here, the 
Petitioners have offered no basis, and we find none, upon 
which we could conclude that § 1229b(d)(2) is not rationally 
related to a legitimate government purpose.  See Heller v. 
 8 
Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1993) (holding that the burden is 
on the petitioners to show that a statute is not rationally 
related by “negat[ing] every conceivable basis which might 
support it,” whether or not the basis has a foundation in the 
record). 
Turning to the international law claims, the Petitioners 
first rely on a decision of the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights (“IACHR”), Smith v. United States, Case 
12.562, Inter-Am. Comm‟n H.R., Report No. 81/10 (2010), 
2010 IACHR 100, 2010 WL 6758869 (also available at 
http://www.cidh.oas.org/casos/10.eng.htm.)  They claim that 
the United States is bound by the IACHR‟s finding that 
removing lawful permanent residents without giving them an 
opportunity for a meaningful hearing would violate numerous 
articles of the “American Declaration of the Rights and 
Duties of Man” (“American Declaration”), arts. 5, 6, 7, 16, 
and 17, O.A.S. Res. XXX (1948), O.A.S. Off. Rec. 
OEA/Ser.L/V/I.4 rev. (1965).  The Petitioners also argue that 
the United States must abide by a 2008 IACHR decision that 
the United States is “bound to respect” the American 
Declaration.  See Mortlock v. United States, Case 12.534, 
Inter-Am. Comm‟n H.R., Report No. 63/08 (July 25, 2008), 
2008 IACHR 893, 2008 WL 6857315 (also available at 
http://www.cidh.oas.org/casos/08.eng.htm.)  In support of 
their claim, the Petitioners cite the Charter of the 
Organization of American States (OAS), which was 
originally ratified by the United States in 1951, and ratified as 
amended in 1968.  The OAS Charter provided for the creation 
of the IACHR and created the American Convention on 
Human Rights (the “American Convention”) to establish the 
Commission.  OAS Charter (Amended) Article 112, 21 
U.S.T. 607; see also Garza v. Lappin, 253 F.3d 918, 924-25 
(7th Cir. 2001).  The American Convention charged the 
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IACHR with interpreting the American Declaration.  
Organization of American States, American Convention on 
Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 
U.N.T.S. 123, 9 I.L.M. 673. 
We conclude that the IACHR‟s decision does not 
create an obligation binding on the United States for the 
following reasons.  First, the language of the OAS Charter 
and of the IACHR‟s governing statute indicates that IACHR‟s 
decisions are not binding on the United States.  In Garza, the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals examined whether the 
United States was obligated to follow the IACHR‟s report 
recommending that Garza‟s execution under a federal death 
sentence would violate international human rights standards 
set forth in the American Declaration.  In holding that the 
United States was not so bound, the Court of Appeals 
reasoned that 
[n]othing in the OAS Charter suggests an 
intention that member states [including the 
United States] will be bound by the 
Commission‟s decisions before the American 
Convention goes into effect.  To the contrary, 
the OAS Charter‟s reference to the Convention 
shows that the signatories to the Charter 
intended to leave for another day any agreement 
to create an international human rights 
organization with the power to bind members. 
 10 
Garza v. Lappin, 253 F.3d at 925.
 4
 
As for the IACHR‟s governing statute, the Statute of 
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (the 
“Commission‟s Statute”), the Garza Court noted that the law 
set forth two separate procedures for the IACHR based on the 
OAS member nation‟s status vis-à-vis ratification of the 
American Convention.  Id.  By setting forth two different 
procedures for OAS members states that have ratified the 
American Convention and for those that have not ratified it, 
the governing statute implicitly recognized the distinction 
between the obligations created under the OAS Charter and 
those created (or not created) by the American Convention.  
Id.  Moreover, the Court of Appeals reasoned, the language of 
the Commission‟s statute indicated that the IACHR did not 
                                                 
4
 The OAS Charter expressly provides for the IACHR 
“to serve as a consultative organ of the Organization in these 
[human rights] matters.”  OAS Charter (amended) Article 
112, 21 U.S.T. 607. 
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have the power to bind member states.
5
  “The Commission‟s 
power is only to make „recommendations,‟ which, according 
to the plain language of the term, are not binding.”  Id.  We 
agree with the reasoning and conclusions of the Seventh 
Circuit in Garza.  We hold that the IACHR‟s advisory 
opinions are not binding on the United States and, therefore, 
they are not enforceable domestically. 
Second, to the extent that the IACHR operates under 
the authority given to it by the American Convention, its 
                                                 
5
 Articles 18 and 20 of the Commission‟s Statute 
empower the IACHR “to make recommendations to the 
governments of the states on the adoption of progressive 
measures in favor of human rights in the framework of their 
legislation, constitutional provisions and international 
commitments, as well as appropriate measures to further 
observance of those rights; . . . to pay particular attention to 
the observance of the human rights referred to in [certain 
provisions of] the American Declaration of the Rights and 
Duties of Man; . . . [and] to examine communications 
submitted to it, . . . and to make recommendations to [the 
government of any member state not a Party to the 
Convention], when it finds this appropriate . . . .”  
Organization of American States, Statute of the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, 1 October 1979, 
O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser.P/IX.0.2/80, Vol. 1 at 88, available 
at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b38e2b.html.  
See also Garza, 253 F.3d at 925. 
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decisions are not enforceable domestically.
6
  Although the 
United States is a signatory to the American Convention, it 
has not ratified the Convention to date, and thus, the 
American Convention does not have the force of law in the 
United States.  Garza v. Lappin, 253 F.3d at 925; see also 
Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 258 (2d Cir. 
2003).
7
  As for the American Declaration, unlike the 
American Convention and the OAS Charter, the Declaration 
                                                 
6
 A treaty (or international agreement) binds the United 
States internationally upon its ratification by two-thirds of the 
Senate.  U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.; see also Auguste v. 
Ridge, 395 F.3d 123, 141 n.18 (3d Cir. 2005) (describing the 
treaty-making process of the executive branch and the 
Senate).  A ratified treaty “is the law of the land as an act of 
Congress is, whenever its provisions prescribe a rule by 
which the rights of the private citizen or subject may be 
determined.”  Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 
595 F.2d 1287, 1298 (3d Cir. 1979) (quoting Head Money 
Cases (Edye v. Robertson), 112 U.S. 580, 598-99 (1884)).  
Unless a treaty is self-executing, it must be implemented by 
legislation before it gives rise to a private cause of action.  
Mannington Mills, Inc., 595 F.2d at 1298; see also Medillin v. 
Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 505 & n.2 (2008).  Unratified treaties 
are not binding on the United States and do not have the force 
of law.  Garza v. Lappin, 253 F.3d at 925. 
7
 As of June 30, 2010, the United States has not 
ratified the American Convention.  See 
http://www.cidh.oas.org (follow “Basic Documents 
Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System” 
hyperlink; then under “American Convention on Human 
Rights,” follow “Signatures and Current Status of 
Ratification” hyperlink). 
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is not a treaty.  In the best sense, the American Declaration, 
adopted by United States and twenty other original OAS 
member states at the Ninth International Conference of 
American States in Bogotá, Colombia in 1948, represents a 
noble statement of the human rights aspirations of the 
American States, but creates no binding set of obligations.  
See Igartua v. United States, 626 F.3d 592, 603 n.11 (1st Cir. 
2010) (holding that the American Declaration “is merely an 
aspirational document”); Garza v. Lappin, 253 F.3d at 923 
(same); Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d at 263 
(same).  Accordingly, neither the unratified American 
Convention nor the American Declaration is itself enforceable 
domestically. 
Next, the Petitioners argue that the current statutory 
construction of 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b) does not comply with 
customary international law as expressed in Article 3(1) of 
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(“CRC”), Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3, available at 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/crc.htm.
8
  The Petitioners 
concede that the United States has not ratified the CRC.  The 
Petitioners broadly assert that CRC has been ratified by a host 
of countries and that the United States is essentially alone in 
removing aliens without a hearing to determine the equities 
pertaining to their removal, but they offer no evidence that the 
States Parties have taken significant steps to put Article 3(1) 
into practice.  In any event, even if we assume, arguendo, that 
Article 3(1) of the CRC constitutes customary international 
                                                 
8
 Article 3(1) provides that “[i]n all actions concerning 
children, whether undertaken by public or private social 
welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities 
or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a 
primary consideration.” 
 14 
law, we conclude that Article 3(1) is not binding on the 
United States or this Court to the extent that it conflicts with 8 
U.S.C. § 1229b(b), in which Congress set forth the extent to 
which a child‟s hardship may be considered in determining 
eligibility for cancellation of removal.  See Payne-Barahona 
v. Gonzales, 474 F.3d 1, 3-4 (1st Cir. 2007) (stating that 
where customary international law conflicts with a federal 
statute, “the clear intent of Congress would control”); 
Martinez-Lopez v. Gonzales, 454 F.3d 500, 502-03 (5th Cir. 
2006) (holding that customary international law “cannot 
override congressional intent as expressed by statute”) (citing 
other cases). 
Accordingly, we will deny the petition for review. 
